Abstract-This paper considers a method for improving physical layer security of wireless networks with full-duplex radio. In particular, fast algorithms are developed to compute power allocations in subcarriers, subject to power and rate constraints, to maximize the secrecy capacity of a three-node network consisting of a source, a full-duplex destination, and an eavesdropper. A residual level of radio self-interference channel is considered. The optimal power allocation at the destination is found to be significant especially when its power budget is high. Also studied in this paper are a network with multiple full-duplex destinations and another network with multiple sources. Using the algorithms developed in this paper, we are able to show that a multiuser strategy that optimizes the power distributions among the users (in terms of either the sources or the destinations) can yield a substantial gain of secrecy capacity over a single-user strategy.
A basic goal of physical layer security is to ensure a sufficient level of secrecy capacity against eavesdroppers while maintaining a desired level of reception quality for desired receivers. The research in this area includes both information theoretical study [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] and signal processing study [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . The former mostly focuses on bounds and asymptotical limits while the latter tends to be innovative in the design of architectures and algorithms. This paper is about the latter. However, the exact classification of a work on physical layer security into one of these two categories is not always suitable.
The signal processing study of physical layer security includes those on transmit antenna beamforming which steers transmitted signal towards desired receivers and away from eavesdroppers [9] , [10] , artificial noise injection which deteriorates the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at eavesdroppers [11] [12] [13] , and cooperative relays which perform beamforming, jamming or both [14] [15] [16] . More recently, there have been research activities to utilize full-duplex radio for enhanced physical layer security [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . A latest implementation of full duplex radio for short range communications is reported in [27] . Such a radio that can transmit and receive at the same time and same frequency can be used not only for increased spectral efficiency but also for increased security, the latter of which is the focus of this paper.
We will first consider a three-node multi-subcarrier network consisting of a source (Alice), a full-duplex destination (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve). Bob is able to receive the signal from Alice and at the same time to transmit a jamming noise against Eve. We will study how to allocate transmission power in the subcarriers for both Alice and Bob to maximize the secrecy capacity against Eve. We will also consider extensions to multiple full-duplex destinations and multiple sources.
In practice, the three-node network considered here may correspond to a special operation where for example a key is distributed from Alice to Bob, and Eve is considered illegitimate to receive the key. But under normal circumstances where for example some public information is shared, all nodes can communicate friendly with each other and their channel state information be made available to all. For this reason, we will assume in this paper that Alice and Bob know their channel amplitudes with respect to Eve during such a special operation. We will utilize the knowledge of channel amplitudes in computing power allocations for maximum secrecy capacity. We will focus on developing fast algorithms for this purpose. Such a fast algorithm can be used for real-time applications in mobile scenario.
Unlike [19] , [21] , [23] , we take into account the residual self-interference at Bob. It is known that even with the state of the art radio self-interference cancellation methods, there is always certain amount of residual self-interference [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . Another unique feature of this work is that we consider both power and rate constraints in maximizing the secrecy capacity while most of the prior works on physical layer security such as [8] [9] [10] [11] , [13] , [16] [17] [18] , [20] , [21] , [23] only considered power constraints. Obviously, in order to transmit a packet from Alice to Bob, a preselected data rate for the packet should be guaranteed.
Much of this paper is a development of fast algorithms to solve non-convex optimization problems. These problems cannot be solved directly by such optimization software as CVX. We exploit in great depth the problem structures via the KarushKuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. For several non-convex subproblems, we are able to find their optimal solutions by solving the KKT conditions. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we show in detail the problem description of the three-node network under consideration and some propositions useful to simplify the problem. In Section III, we formulate and solve the problem of power allocation to maximize the secrecy capacity of the network subject to power-only constraints, which provides important preparation for the rest of this paper. An asymptotic limit of the secrecy capacity subject to high power is also given in Section III. In Section IV, we consider the above mentioned problem but subject to both power and rate constraints. We consider the extension to multiple destinations in Section V, and the extension to multiple sources in Section VI. The simulation results are presented in Section VII. Several proofs are detailed in appendices.
II. A THREE-NODE NETWORK
A three-node wireless network is shown as Fig. 1 . This is an ad hoc network where every node uses the same frequency band to communicate with other nodes. In this network (or a snapshot of this network), the source (Alice) plans to transmit some sensitive information to its legitimate destination (Bob) while a potential eavesdropper (Eve) is to be prevented from "wiretapping" the transmission. We assume that the channel on each link consists of N orthogonal subcarriers and the fading on each subcarrier is flat. To actively deteriorate the SINR at Eve, Bob will use its full-duplex capacity to transmit interference noise in the same channel where at the same time it receives the signal from Alice. Potentially, all nodes could work in full duplex. But this would make the network much more complicated. If all nodes only work in half duplex, then this is a conventional network for which the conventional methods can be applied. The setting of our problems is somewhere in between the two extremes.
Let x S (t) ∈ C N ×1 be the signal vector (of i.i.d. symbols of zero mean and unit variance) to be transmitted by Alice and x D (t) ∈ C N ×1 be the jamming noise vector (of i.i.d. symbols of zero mean and unit variance) to be transmitted by Bob. Then the signal vectors to be received by Bob and Eve can be respectively expressed as:
where h S D ∈ C N ×1 is the channel response vector from Alice to Bob, h S E ∈ C N ×1 is that from Alice to Eve, 
are independent white Gaussian noise of zero mean and unit variance. The symbol '•' denotes the Hadamard product (i.e., element-wise product). And ρ is the self-interference attenuation factor. Let p
S denote the nth element of p S , and other similar notations are defined accordingly. The SINRs of the nth subcarrier at Bob and Eve are respectively:
A n x n 1 + B n y n and γ
where
D . Note that we will assume that the channel amplitudes A n , B n , C n and D n , ∀n are available for computing power allocations. None of the channel phases is required. In practice, the amplitudes are much slower in changing and much easier to estimate than the phases are. Since the channel amplitudes have a large coherence time, any data transmission from Eve to Alice and Bob could allow Alice and Bob to know the required channel amplitude responses from Alice and Bob to Eve via the reciprocal property. We also assume that Alice and Bob are fully cooperative.
The secrecy capacity of the system in bits per channel use is known as [33] :
where ΔR n (x n , y n ) = log(1 + γ
. The pre-multiplier 1/N in (2) should be removed if the N subcarriers are spatial subcarriers (due to use of multiple antennas) instead of temporal subcarriers (due to time and/or frequency divisions). This paper is concerned about maximizing the secrecy capacity R s (x, y) through power allocations at both Alice and Bob. And most of the technical details are aimed to reduce the computational complexity.
In relation to R s (x, y), we defineR s (x, y) as:
where ΔR(x, y) = 1 N N n =1 ΔR n (x n , y n ). Shown below are three important propositions. Proposition 1 will be used to simplify the secrecy capacity as an objective function from a form of "summation of maximums" to a form of "maximum of sums". Proposition 2 is a precursor of Proposition 3, the latter of which provides a necessary condition to determine whether a subcarrier at Bob needs to be allocated with nonzero power.
Proposition 1: R s (x, y) is no less thanR s (x, y), and max(R s (x, y)) = max(R s (x, y)) subject to
Proof: See Appendix A. Proposition 2: For any given x n ∈ (0, +∞), there is at most one stationary point for ΔR n (x n , y n ) with regard to y n ∈ (0, +∞).
Proof: See Appendix B. Proposition 3: For any given x n , ∀n, a necessary condition that the optimal value of y n is nonzero is that B n D n < 1 and
III. POWER ALLOCATION UNDER POWER CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we consider the problem of power allocation for maximization of secrecy capacity subject to power-only constraints. Specifically, we consider the following problem:
where we assume the power budget P S at source and the power budget P D at destination. Note that N . = {1, . . . , N}. With Proposition 1, the power allocation problem (4a) can be transformed equivalently to:
Solving this non-convex optimization problem (5) directly is still difficult. We will treat this problem in two phases: in phase one, we optimally allocate the source power for a given destination power vector; and in phase two, we optimally allocate the destination power for a given source power vector. The two phases will be iterated until convergence. Note that since the two-phase iteration algorithm increases the same (upper bounded) objective function at each iteration and each phase, this algorithm is guaranteed to be locally convergent. Such a property is a special case of one that is discussed in [34] .
In the following two sections, the two phases of the two-phase algorithm are discussed separately in detail.
A. Source Power Allocation
With a fixed destination power allocation, the source power allocation problem from (5) is:
The above problem is still non-convex due to the non-convex cost function. But we will be able to find the solution to this problem by finding the solution to its KKT conditions as follows. 1 The Lagrangian function of the problem can be written as:
The solution to the problem (6) must satisfy the following KKT conditions [35] :
Before solving these KKT conditions, we introduce the following proposition: Proposition 4: Let x † be the solution of the source power allocation phase. Then, for any n, if α n ≤ β n , then x † n = 0. Furthermore, we have either
So, we have x † n = 0 for n ∈ {n|α n ≤ β n , n ∈ N}, and for the remaining subcarriers, the power allocation results can be obtained by solving the following simplified KKT conditions:
It can be verified that
From the first equation in (11), we know that υ is a decreasing function of x n , ∀n ∈ Θ y . Thus, these simplified KKT conditions can be solved by a bisection search algorithm as shown in the table of  Algorithm 1 2 . This algorithm is similar to a solution in [33] . 1 In general, the KKT conditions are necessary conditions for the optimal solution. But for all convex problems and some non-convex problems, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal solution. When the solution to the KKT conditions is unique, it must be the optimal solution to the original problem. When KKT conditions (of a nonconvex problem) have more than one solutions, one has to be innovative to exploit other properties associated with the optimal solution to rule out the non-optimal solutions if possible. 2 For KKT conditions, all the Lagrange multipliers (such as v and λ n ) associated with the inequalities must be non-negative. For a given v and λ n = 0, the solution to ϕ n (x † n ) = v may or may not be positive. If there is a positive solution of x n , the corresponding λ n is zero as assumed in the first place. If there is no positive solution of x n , the corresponding optimal solution of x n is zero and the corresponding λ n should be positive (although its actual value is now useless).Also, ϕ n (x † n ) = υ is equivalent to an quadratic equation which has two roots, only one of the two roots can be greater than or equal to 0, which is the valid solution.
Algorithm 1: Source power allocation algorithm-Solution to (11) .
Input:
A n , B n , C n , D n , y n , ∀n ∈ N; Source power constraint P S ; Accuracy threshold ε. Output:
for n ∈ Θ y do 5:
if υ ≥ ϕ n (0) then 6:
x † n = 0; 7: 
B. Destination Power Allocation
With a given source power allocation, the destination power allocation problem from (5) is as follows:
By Proposition 3, the above problem is equivalent to:
and y n = 0, ∀n ∈ Φ. The above problem is once again non-convex. To find its solution, we will consider its KKT conditions. The Lagrangian function of this problem is:
The KKT conditions of (13) are:
Appendix C shows that for any n ∈ Φ, ΔR n has four unique cases/patterns as shown in Fig. 12 (b) (i.e., case I, case II, case III and case IV). Since ψ n (
, then ψ n (y n ) has two kinds of patterns as shown in Fig. 2 . The first kind corresponds to the cases II, III and IV in Fig. 12(b) , for which there must be nonzero power allocation. From (17), we know that the region of interest for y n is where ψ n (y n ) > 0. In this region, ψ n (y n ) is decreasing with increasing y n :
Proposition 5: ψ n (y n ) is decreasing with increasing y n as long as ψ n (y n ) > 0 if
Whereas, the second kind corresponds to the case I in Fig. 12(b) , for which the optimal y n should obviously be set to zero. So the KKT conditions in (16) can be solved with a bisection search of υ as shown in Algorithm 2.
C. Asymptotic Performance Analysis
In this section, we present the achievable upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the three-node network when the power budget is large. For the subcarrier n ∈ Φ and a given source power x n , the optimal destination power y Algorithm 2: Destination allocation algorithm-Solution to (16) .
Input:
A n , B n , C n , D n , x n , ∀n ∈ Φ; Destination power constraint P D ; Accuracy threshold ε. Output:
Solve ψ n (y † n ) = 0 by solving an equivalent 2nd-order polynomial which has only one positive root; 6: end if 7: end for
Temporary variable μ = 0; y † n = 0, ∀n ∈ Φ. 10:
for n ∈ Φ do 13:
Solve ψ n (y † n ) = υ by solving an equivalent 4th-order polynomial which has only one positive root. on the solution of (B.2)):
for large x n , we have that y * n = ω n x 1 2 n , where
So for this subcarrier, the achievable upper bound of the secrecy capacity is:
For n ∈ Φ, we have y n = 0 and hence:
Therefore, the achievable upper bound of the secrecy capacity for the entire system is:
In this upper bound, the term max{0, log(
)} is the contribution from the full-duplex transmission in the destination. The necessary and sufficient condition for the full-duplex transmission to improve the secrecy capacity in the nth subcarrier (where both x n and y n are large) is D n > B n . We also see that the less is the self-interference, the more is the secrecy capacity generated.
D. Computational Complexity
Let ε denote the required accuracy for the multiplier υ for both phases. Assuming that N tw o−phase iterations are required before the two-phase iteration algorithm converges. Then, the order of the complexity of the (bisection-based) two-phase algorithm in terms of ε and
as the complexity order. Note that, the simulation results 3 show that the typical value of N tw o−phase is around 5.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION UNDER POWER AND RATE CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we consider power allocation for maximizing the secrecy capacity of the three-node network subject to power constraints as well as a source-to-destination data rate constraint. Namely, we consider the following non-convex problem:
P ower constraint (4b).
where C S D is the required source-to-destination rate. (In the scenario of the key transmission, this rate should be the rate of the data packet containing the key.) The set Θ y is the same set defined in (11) , and ΔR n (x n , y n ) < 0, ∀n ∈ Θ y (which contribute zero to the secrecy capacity). This is why the sum in the objective function is over n ∈ Θ y . However, due to the rate constraint, the optimal x n may be positive for some n ∈ Θ y . So, the sum in the rate constraint must still be done over all n ∈ N. The larger is the secrecy capacity (the first line in (22) ), the more secure is a packet with that data rate from the source to the destination (the second line in (22)). Depending on the channel conditions, it is possible that some subcarriers are not secure (i.e., ΔR n (x n , y n ) ≤ 0 for some n). But as long as C S . = 1 N n ∈N max(ΔR n (x n , y n ), 0) > 0, there are always some secure subcarriers, and a packet encoded across all the subcarriers to meet the secrecy capacity C S (and the rate constraint C S D ) is said to be secure with the secrecy capacity C S .
Although the rate constraint introduces a complex situation where x n , ∀n and y n , ∀n now have a shared constraint, the twophase iteration method is still applicable. Each of the two phases is discussed next.
A. Source Power Allocation
In this phase, y is fixed and the optimization problem (22) reduces to the following convex problem:
where α n and β n are defined in (7) . The Lagrangian function of this problem is:
The KKT conditions of (23) are
whereφ n (x n ) = ϕ n (x n ) as defined by (10) for n ∈ Θ y , and ϕ n (x n ) = 0 for n ∈ Θ y . From the first equation in (25) , we see that if λ is fixed, υ is a decreasing function of x n , and if υ is fixed, λ is an increasing function of x n . Hence, the conditions of (25) can be solved by a two-dimensional bisection search as summarized in the table of Algorithm 3. The bisection search of υ is to meet the power constraint, and the bisection search of λ is to meet the rate constraint. For each given pair of υ and λ, the first equation in (25) is equivalent to a quadratic equation of x n and hence has a closed-form solution for x n .
Algorithm 3:
Algorithm to solve the problem (23) by solving the KKT conditions (25) , which uses 2-D bisection search for υ and λ.
Input:
A n , B n , C n , D n , y n , ∀n ∈ N; Source power constraint P S ; SD capacity constraint C S D ; Accuracy threshold ε, ζ.
Output:
1: Set λ = 0 (i.e., removing the rate constraint), do the search for υ and x (similar to Algorithm 1); 2: Calculate SD capacity C(x); 3: if C(x) > C S D then 4: return x (This means that the rate constraint is satisfied by the solution without the rate constraint even imposed.); 5: else 6: Two-Dimensional bisection search: Do bisection search for υ > 0 to meet the power constraint up to the precision ε. For each given υ, do bisection search for λ > 0 to meet the rate constraint up to the precision ζ. For each given pair of υ and λ, find x n ≥ 0 as the solution to the first equation in (25) for each n ∈ N. 7: return x.
8: end if

B. Destination Power Allocation
In this phase, x is fixed and the problem (22) reduces to the following (still non-convex) problem:
By Proposition 3, the problem (26) can be rewritten as
and y n = 0, ∀n ∈ Ψ ⊥ y .
Because the set Ψ y is a function of y n , ∀n, we will use the following approach to determine Ψ y :
We start with the largest possible set of Ψ y which is Ψ , and continue the iteration. Now the main challenge is how to solve the problem (27) with a given Ψ y . Since solving the exact KKT conditions of (27) is very tedious even if feasible, we will now use a sequential convex programming (SCP) method [36] to relax the nonconvex rate constraint into a convex one by sequential linearization.
Let
By the first order Taylor's series expansion around y = y (k ) , F (y) can be approximated as:
We compute the updated estimate y (k +1) by the following:
The Lagrangian function of this problem is:
The KKT conditions of (32) are: where ψ n (y n ) is defined in Eq. (17) . From the first condition of (34), one can verify by using Proposition 5 that λ and υ are each monotonic functions of y n as long as ψ n (y n ) > 0. So, the KKT conditions in (34) can be solved by a 2-D bisection algorithm which is similar to Algorithm 3 but omitted here. Every new solution of y n , ∀n needs to be used to update the problem (32) until convergence.
C. Computational Complexity
Let ε denote the required accuracy in the bisection search for υ, and ζ denote that for λ.
For source power allocation, the complexity is O(N 2D ,S (log 2 ( Then, the total complexity for the proposed two-phase iteration algorithm is the sum of the above two expressions scaled by N tw o−phase .
We see that with both power and rate constraints, the destination power allocation typically dominates the complexity of the two-phase algorithm. The simulation results 4 show that the typical values of N 2D ,D and N S C P are less than 10 and that of N 2D ,S is less than 50.
V. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE DESTINATIONS
In this section, we consider a network with one source, one eavesdropper and multiple full-duplex destinations as shown in Fig. 3 . The source sends an independent message to each destination using an independent set of subcarriers. (This differs from a conventional definition of broadcast where all destinations use a common channel at the same time. The corresponding problem for the conventional broadcast goes beyond the scope of this paper.) Let x is the minimum required power to meet the rate constraint for group
is that for group M 2 . The heavy dots in each of the three cases indicate the optimal solution for P S ,M 1 and P S ,M 2 .
the mth destination. Then, we can write: 
So, the secrecy capacity in bits per channel use for the mth destination/Bob is: 
Note that
and y m ,n = p 
where 1 is the vector of all ones, P D ,m and C m are the power budget and the target rate for Bob m, and
To present a fast algorithm to solve the problem (39), we first denote its solution by (R M , x M , y M ) where R M is the maximum of the objective function, and x M = {x (m ) , ∀m ∈ M} and y M = {y (m ) , ∀m ∈ M} are the corresponding sets of vectors of power allocations at the source and the destinations. Furthermore, R M depends on P S , P D ,m , ∀m ∈ M and C m , ∀m ∈ M. We will also express this relationship by R M (P S , P D ,M , C M ) or simply R M (P S,M ). Note that while R M and P S,M are always scalars here, P D ,M and C M can be viewed as sets, i.e.,
It is obvious that if the set M has only one entry, then the solution to (39) can be readily obtained by the algorithms shown in the previous sections where M = 1.
If M = 2, we can decompose M into two subsets M 1 and M 2 where each subset has only one entry. Then, we can obtain R M 1 (P S,M 1 ) and R M 2 (P S − P S,M 1 ) for any given P S,M 1 satisfying P S ≥ P S,M 1 ≥ 0. For M 1 , there is a minimum amount of power P † S,M 1 to meet the rate constraint, which can be obtained by the standard water-filling algorithm. Similarly, for M 2 , there is a corresponding
) which is denoted as Case I as shown in Fig. 4 , then there is no way to increase the secrecy capacity for the whole set
). This is because R M i (P S,M i ) is strictly increasing (or possibly staying at zero initially) with increasing P S,M i according to Proposition 4. In this case,
) which is denoted as Case II as shown in Fig. 4 ,
). If none of the above two cases is true, we have the Case III as shown in Fig. 4 , for which we can apply a bisection search to find P * S,M 1
). If M > 2, we can start with the above decomposition from M to M 1 and M 2 . Then, we can further decompose M 1 and/or M 2 into smaller subsets. We can repeat the above process until each
while (μ > ) do 17: return
end if 29:
end if 30: else 31:
return R M , x M , y M ; 34: end if subset has only one entry. At each of these decompositions, we perform the optimal partition of a given source power between two groups/subsets. Also note that this is a recursive process where an upper layer operation needs to call upon lower layer operations repeatedly until convergence. The number of these layers of recursions is (or about) log 2 M .
The details of the entire algorithm are shown as Algorithm 4. In Algorithm 4, the function Minimum_Power_Require(.,.) is to calculate the minimum required power to achieve the target rates which can be obtained by the standard waterfilling algorithm. The function Two_Phases_Allocation_with_Rate(.,.) is the entire algorithm developed in section IV. The function Secrecy_Capacity(.) computes the corresponding secrecy capacity. 
VI. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE SOURCES
In this section, we consider a network with multiple sources, one full-duplex destination and one eavesdropper as shown in 
using the same set of subcarriers. Then, the signal vector received by Bob, corresponding to the source m, is the same as (35) , and the signal vector received by Eve is the same as (36) . Furthermore, the corresponding secrecy capacity is the same as (37). As a dual form of (39), we now have the following power allocation problem:
where P S,m , C m and C
(m )
S D are similarly defined (although m is now the index of the sources but not the destinations). For example, P S,m is now the power budget to be used by the mth source for transmission to the destination.
Let us denote the solution to the problem (41) by
where R M , x M and y M are similarly defined as before. The mth entry of the M × 1 vector z M , denoted by z M (m), is either 1 or 0. If the allocated power P D ,m is to be completely utilized by the (full-duplex) destination for receiving the signal from the source m, z M (m) is set to be zero. Otherwise, it is set to be one. Since R M depends on P S,m , ∀m ∈ M, P D and C m , ∀m ∈ M, we will express such a dependency by R M (P D ,M ) where P D ,M denotes all the power available for (but not necessarily to be actually used by) the destination when receiving the signals from the sources in the set M. Note that it is possible in some cases that to achieve the maximum secrecy capacity, the full-duplex destination should not use all its available power in transmitting the artificial noise. Also note that
Obviously, if M = 1 or equivalently M has only one entry, the problem (41) can be solved by the algorithm developed before for the three-node network. Now assume M = 2. Let M be partitioned into M 1 and M 2 . In this case, each of M 1 and M 2 has only one entry. Then, we can obtain R M 1 (0) and R M 2 (P D ), where all the destination power is made available only to
, which is Case I shown in Fig. 6 , then we have obtained the optimal secrecy capacity for M:
In this case, we can utilize
for M 1 so that the secrecy capacity for M 1 can be increased although the optimal secrecy capacity for M remains the same. See Case I in Fig. 6 .
If Case I does not hold, we can similarly obtain R M 1 (P D ) and R M 2 (0), where all the destination power is made available only to M 1 . If R M 1 (P D ) ≤ R M 2 (0), which is Case II shown in Fig. 6 , then we have obtained the optimal secrecy capacity for M:
for M 2 to increase the secrecy capacity for M 2 although the optimal secrecy capacity for M stays the same. See Case II in Fig. 6 .
If none of Cases I and II is true, we must have Case III as shown in Fig. 6 for which we can use a bisection search to find
) and hence the optimal secrecy capacity for
). More generally, if M > 2, we can first partition M into M 1 and M 2 and compute the optimal binary partition of the destination power
. If M i for some i ∈ {1, 2} has more than one entries, we then further partition M i into two smaller sets M i,1 and M i,2 and compute the optimal binary partition of any given power value
. The above process can be repeated recursively, which leads to Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6. Note that Algorithm 5 is part of Algorithm 6. The purpose of using Algorithm 6 instead of using just Algorithm 5 is to ensure that all available power P D is utilized to improve the secrecy capacities for all sources although Algorithm 5 alone would yield the same secrecy capacity for the entire network (in terms of "max min of") as Algorithm 6.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results based on our proposed algorithms. In the simulation, all channel magnitudes are Rayleigh distributed with unit mean square, and the selfinterference attenuation factor ρ is set to be 0.5 unless stated otherwise.
A. Three-Node Network Under Power-Only Constraints
With N = 8 and P S = P D = P , shown in Fig. 7 (a) are four curves of averaged secrecy capacity versus the power P . We see that in the very low power region, "optimal source power allocation" has an advantage over "optimal destination power allocation". This is because at low power, the SINR on each subcarrier (see (1)) is dominated by the source power and the destination power has little effect.
While in the high power region, "optimal destination power allocation" is much more effective than "optimal source power allocation". This is because at higher power, the uniform source power allocation approaches its optimal allocation, and hence optimal destination power allocation subject to uniform source power allocation approaches the joint optimality at both source and destination. However, the uniform destination power allocation is generally not optimal at high power. We see indeed that the results for "optimal destination power allocation" and "joint optimal power allocation" achieve the same upper bound at high power. The effect of the optimal destination power allocation at high power is very significant. Shown in Fig. 7 (b) are results for a varying level of selfinterference channel magnitude. Clearly, the less the selfinterference, the higher secrecy capacity achievable.
The two-phase iterations typically take less than 5 iterations to converge. The bisection search within each of the two phases converges rapidly (logarithmic fast) as expected.
B. Three-Node Network Under Power and Rate Constraints
Shown in Fig. 8(a) and (b) is a comparison of three different cases in terms of the secrecy capacity against Eve (Fig. 8(a) ) and the Alice-to-Bob data rate (Fig. 8(b) ) for a specific realization of all channels where A n < C n , ∀n ∈ N (i.e., Eve has a stronger channel from Alice than Bob has from Alice for all subcarriers).
In case I, the data rate is maximized subject to power constraints at Alice and Bob but there is no secrecy capacity constraint. The resulting data rate is denoted by C S D ,I (which is obtained by the standard waterfilling algorithm). And the resulting secrecy capacity R S E ,I is zero for this channel realization as expected.
while (μ > ) do 15:
end if 24:
end while 25:
return 
P D = P D -Sum(y K ); 6: end while
In case II, the secrecy capacity is maximized subject to power constraints at Alice and Bob and also a Alice-to-Bob Fig. 7 . The achieved secrecy of four different schemes (averaged over 100 channel realizations). Here, "UB" means "asymptotical limit at high power", "JA" means "joint optimal power allocation at both source and destination", "DA" means "optimal destination power allocation while uniform source power allocation", "SA" means "optimal source power allocation while uniform destination power allocation", and "UA" means "uniform power allocation at both source and destination". In case III, the secrecy capacity is maximized with power-only constraints at Alice and Bob but no rate constraint. The resulting secrecy capacity is denoted by R S E ,III and the resulting data rate is C S D ,III .
We see that because of the rate constraint, case II results in a much better tradeoff between the source-to-destination data rate and the network's secrecy capacity than the other two cases. In (a) , the three curves with rate constraint and the other three curves without rate constraint are relatively intertwined together here. In (b), with rate constraint, the constrained rates and achieved rates are indistinguishable and hence not plotted separately.).
C. Joint Power Allocation for Multiple Destinations
We choose C m = γC † m , where C † m is the maximum achievable data rate from Alice to Bob when P S M is allocated at Alice for transmission to the mth destination. With γ = 0.9 and M = 3, the achieved secrecy capacities and source-to-destination data rates are shown in Fig. 9 (a) and (b) respectively. Also shown in these two figures are the corresponding results without any rate constraint. We see that with rate constraints, we lose a small amount of secrecy capacities while maintaining a substantial gain of data rates.
D. Joint Power Allocation for Multiple Sources
Here, the rate constraint for the mth source is set to be C m = γC † m where C † m is the maximum achievable rate from the mth source to the destination with the power P S,m = P S M allocated to the mth source. The secrecy capacities and data rates for total three sources are presented in Fig. 10(a) and (b) . We also see here that with rate constraint even though we lose a small amount of secrecy capacity, we obtain a substantial gain of data rate.
E. Comparison Between Single-User Strategy and Multi-User Strategy
The extension from the single-user strategy (i.e., a single source and a single destination) to the multi-user strategy (i.e., a single source and multiple destinations, or multiple sources and a single destination) in the previous section was established in terms of power allocation algorithm. It is clear that the singleuser strategy developed before is a special case of the multi-user strategy. There should be no doubt that the multi-user strategy should yield result no worse than the single-user strategy. However, before an optimal algorithm for the multi-user strategy was developed, there would be no way to know how much better the multi-user strategy can do than the single-user strategy. But with In (a) , the three curves with rate constraint and the other three curves without rate constraint are also somewhat intertwined here. In (b), with rate constraint, the constrained rates and achieved rates are indistinguishable and hence not plotted separately.). our algorithm developed in the previous section, we can here provide a quantitative comparison.
Assume N = 4, M = 2 and C m = γC † m with γ = 0.9. Define the gain of the multi-user strategy over the single-user strategy as
where R M is the optimal multi-user secrecy capacity achieved via joint power allocation under two users with total power P , and R 1 and R 2 are the optimal single-user secrecy capacities for user 1 and user 2 respectively each with total power P 2 . Clearly, the gain is a function of the channel realization. We Fig. 12 . Patterns of the function ΔR n (x n , y n ) as in (2) with respect to y n ∈ (0, +∞).
will consider the distribution of the gain over 1000 independent channel realizations. Fig. 11 (a) shows a distribution of the gain with two destinations, and Fig. 11(b) shows a distribution of the gain with two sources. We see that for most of the channel realizations, the gain is not significant. But for some channel realizations, the gain can be as high as 30% to 80%. In fact, the maximum gain can be infinity in theory. Although the probability of such a high gain under random channel realizations does not seem large, the fact that such a high gain exists signifies the importance of the fast power allocation algorithm developed for multi-users.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied fast power allocation algorithms for maximizing secrecy capacity of a three-node network subject to both power and rate constraints. The rate constraint along with self-interference of the full-duplex destination makes this study unique from many previous works. We have also extended this study to a case of multiple sources and another case of multiple destinations. The algorithms developed in this paper have made it possible to show that with a small but non-negligible probability the multi-user strategy can yield a much higher secrecy capacity than the single-user strategy. Future works should consider more scenarios of networks that are of importance in practice.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: It is easy to verify the following inequality:
where the equality holds if and only if R n (x n , y n ) ≥ 0, ∀n. This property also follows from the fact that max(0, a) is a convex function of a and hence
n and y * n should be reset to zero and the saved power could be used to improve positive secrecy components on other subcarriers, and hence the original x * n and y * n would not be optimal. Hence, it must be true that ΔR n (x * n , y * n ) ≥ 0. Then we have
Since R(x, y) ≥R(x, y), the above implies max(R(x, y)) = max(R(x, y)). (A.3)
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: Taking the first-order partial derivative of the function ΔR n (x n , y n ) with respect to y n , we have
Setting it equal to zero, we have where
Because (B.2) is quadratic and it has at most two positive roots, the function ΔR n (x n , y n ) has at most two stationary points with regard to y n ∈ (0, +∞). However, the hypothesis that (B.2) has two positive roots is invalid, which is proved next by contradiction. We assume that (B.2) has two positive roots y (1) n and y (2) n , then it must be true that , and hence A n B n < C n D n and B n < D n . This implies that (B.5) is invalid.
In conclusion, (B.4) and (B.5) can not be satisfied at the same time, and hence there is at most one stationary point for ΔR n (x n , y n ) with regard to y n ∈ (0, +∞).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof: With Proposition 2, we know that for any given x n ∈ (0, +∞), there is at most one stationary point for ΔR n (x n , y n ) with regard to y n ∈ (0, +∞). One can also verify that lim y n →+∞ ΔR n (x n , y n ) = 0 + , when 
When
B n D n > 1, the patterns of ΔR n (x n , y n ) versus y n are illustrated in Fig. 12(a) . These patterns can be inferred by examining (B.4) and (B.5). For example, for Case I in Fig. 12(a) , we have y (1) n + y which means that (B.2) has no positive root and hence there is no stationary point for ΔR n (x n , y n ) with respect to y n ∈ (0, +∞). Also, since ΔR n (x n , 0) > 0 and lim y n →+∞ R n (x n , y n ) = 0 + , ΔR n (x n , y n ) is always decreasing with regard to y n ∈ (0, +∞).
For the other two cases where
B n D n = 1, the patterns of ΔR n (x n , y n ) versus y n are illustrated in Fig. 12(b) and (c), respectively. All these patterns can be verified using the above mentioned method.
Note that a positive y n should make a contribution to ΔR n (x n , y n ) that is both positive and increased from ΔR n (x n , 0). By observing all the patterns shown in Fig. 12(a) -(c), one can conclude that the necessary condition for the optimal value of y n to be nonzero is that , which corresponds to the cases II, III and IV in Fig. 12(b) .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof: The partial derivative of ΔR(x, y) with respect to x n is given as ∂ΔR(x, y) ∂x n = 1 N ∂ΔR n (x n , y n ) ∂x n = ϕ n (x n ).
where ϕ n (x n ) is defined in (10) . First, consider the case α n ≤ β n . It follows that ∂ Δ R(x,y) ∂ x n ≤ 0, i.e., ΔR n (x n , y n ) is a non-increasing function with respect to x n . Since ΔR n (0, y n ) = 0, then ΔR n (x n , y n ) ≤ 0 for any x n > 0. Hence, the optimal power x † n must be zero. Next, consider the case α n > β n . It follows that ∂ Δ R(x,y) ∂ x n > 0, i.e., ΔR n (x n , y n ) is a increasing function with respect to x n . Hence, ΔR n (x n , y n ) > 0 for any x n > 0, and hence the optimal power x † n must be positive. Furthermore, all the power P s must be utilized and shared by those subcarriers where α n > β n .
So, if α n ≤ β n , ∀n ∈ N, no power will be allocated, and we have 
APPENDIX E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof: It is equivalent to consider the cases II, III and IV shown in Fig. 12(b) where Now with α > β for y n ∈ (0, y ‡ n ) and ξ > θ, we obtain that ∂ψ n (y n ) ∂y n = 1 N (βθ − αξ) < 0, (E.8)
for y n ∈ (0, y ‡ n ).
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